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I. Introduction
The illicit market in artworks, antiquities, and other cultural property continues to be a
matter of international concern, and the year 2001 saw significant developments in the field
of cultural property law. For example, pursuant to the Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act' (CPIA), the U.S. government entered into significant bilateral agree-
ments with Italy and Bolivia to require importers to prove legal export of archaeological
artifacts and considered renewal of the bilateral agreements with Canada and Peru. It in-
dicted an influential art dealer in New York who allegedly received ancient artworks that
had been stolen and illegally removed from Egypt. Further, a civil action brought by the
United States, pursuant to U.S. ratification of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property,2 led to the return of a Wang Chuzhi Marble Wall Panel to the Cultural
Relics Administration of the People's Republic of China.
Also in 2001, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) adopted the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cul-
tural Heritage, which provides a legal regime to protect the many millennia of history that
resides in shipwrecks and underwater sites. Further, in its new Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity, UNESCO will require its member States to combat the illicit traffic in
cultural property.
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1. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (2001).
2. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property, Apr. 24, 1972, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
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H. UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage
After more than four years of negotiation among expert groups including government
representatives, archaeological and historical experts, and commercial salvage interests, on
November 2, 2001, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted the Convention on the
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.3 The fourth convention adopted by
UNESCO to protect cultural property,4 it states that underwater heritage is under grave
threat due to major advances in underwater salvage and excavation technology and the very
substantial financial rewards that can be obtained in both the legal and illicit world markets
for antiquities and other relics from sunken vessels and sites. In response, the Convention
mandates specific measures to protect "all traces of human existence having a cultural,
historical or archaeological character which have been partially or totally under water, pe-
riodically or continuously, for at least 100 years."' The treaty is now open for ratification
or accession by all UNESCO member States and will come into effect when twenty States
have adopted it in accordance with national treaty law procedures. Although the United
States is not a member of UNESCO, it is eligible to ratify the treaty.
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Ill), which
was negotiated from 1974 to 1982 and came into force in 1994, already imposes a duty on
States to protect objects found at sea that are of an archaeological and historical nature.6
However, UNCLOS I grants States the right to protect the underwater cultural heritage
only in their contiguous zone, which extends 24 miles from the shoreline, and not in their
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which can extend 200 miles from a State's coast, or the
continental shelf, which also extends 200 miles from the shore. 7 In addition, UNCLOS III
does not set out precise procedures for protecting underwater sites.
The new UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage
extends the right of States to "prohibit or authorise any activity directed at [the cultural
heritage]" to their EEZ or to the continental shelf.' States are also asked to "preserve
3. Press Release, General Conference of UNESCO, General Conference Adopts Convention on the
Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/
legalprotection/water/hunl eng/convention.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2002). The text of the Convention is
also available on the UNESCO Web site.
4. The other three are: the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict (249 U.N.T.S. 270); the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (823 U.N.T.S. 231);
and the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1037
U.N.T.S. 151). The United States has ratified the 1970 Convention (albeit in a somewhat restrictive format-
the CPIA, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.) and the 1972 Convention (16 U.S.C. § 470a- I-part of the 1980 amend-
ments to the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-w). The United States is a signatory of
the 1954 Hague Convention and its ratification is under consideration.
5. Draft Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Agenda
item 8.4, art. 1, U.N. Doc. 31C/24 (2001) [hereinafter Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage].
6. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: FinalAct, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/121, 21 I.L.M. 1245
(1982), arts. 149 and 330.
7. Id. art. 303. Article 56 of UNCLOS III grants a coastal State sovereign rights over all natural resources
of its EEZ, including the seabed resources, but it does not grant a State sovereignty over non-natural objects.
8. Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, supra note 5, art. 9. Critics of the new UNESCO
Convention argue that this provision upsets the carefully negotiated provisions of UNCLOS IlI regarding the
scope of the coastal states' powers over their EEZ and the continental shelf.
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underwater cultural heritage for the benefit of humanity," through the preservation in situ
of underwater cultural heritage if at all possible.' ° The Annex sets forth more specific rules
for the preservation and proper excavation of underwater cultural resources and is derived
from the ICOMOS Charter for the Protection and Management of the Underwater Cul-
tural Heritage. Finally, the commercial exploitation of underwater cultural heritage for
trade or speculation is deemed "fundamentally incompatible with the protection and proper
management of underwater cultural heritage.""
LI. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity
At its General Conference on November 2, 2001, UNESCO also adopted a major new
international ethical standard for cultural development and cultural relations. The new
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity reaffirms the conviction of
UNESCO member States that "intercultural dialogue is the best guarantee of peace."' 2
The comprehensive instrument elevates "cultural diversity to the rank of 'common heritage
of humanity-as necessary for the human race as bio-diversity in the natural realm'-and
makes its protection an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity."3
The document also specifies that "particular attention must be paid to the diversity of the
supply of creative work, to due recognition of the rights of authors and artists" and that
cultural goods "must not be treated as mere commodities or consumer goods."' 4 Instead,
"heritage in all its forms must be preserved, enhanced and handed on to future generations
as a record of human experience and aspirations, so as to foster creativity in all its diversity
and to inspire genuine dialogue among cultures.""s In its "action plan" for implementation,
the document calls upon member States to take appropriate steps to formulate "policies
and strategies for the preservation and enhancement of the cultural and natural heritage"
and to combat "illicit traffic in cultural goods and services.'
6
IV. Cultural Property Implementation Act Developments
The CPIA 7 represents a somewhat restrictive ratification of the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property. The United States enacted the CPIA in 1983 in recog-
nition of the fact that free trade in cultural property had resulted in the pillage of archaeo-
logical and ethnological materials and had deprived many nations of their cultural heritage.
The United States has entered into bilateral agreements pursuant to the CPIA in an attempt
to stem the flow of illicitly excavated works that regularly enter the United States.
9. Id. at 2, 3.
10. Id. at annex, Rule 1.
11. Id. at annex, Rule 2. The rule states that underwater cultural heritage shall not be traded, sold, bought,
or bartered as commercial goods.
12. Press Release, General Conference of UNESCO, General Conference Adopts Universal Declaration
on Cultural Diversity, available at http://www.unesco.org/confgen/press-rel/021 101_cltdiversity.shtnl (last
visited Aug. 1, 2002).
13. Id.
14. Id. art. 8.
15. Id. art. 7.
16. Id. at 5, T 13.
17. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (2001).
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A. BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH ITALY
On January 19, 2001 the United States formally agreed with Italy to impose import
restrictions on Italian archeological material from the pre-classical, classical, and imperial
periods. The far-reaching agreement prohibits unlicensed imports of Italian antiquities
ranging from Etruscan pottery to treasures of the Roman Empire and dating from the ninth
century B.C. to the fourth century A.D. Such restricted objects may enter the United States
only if accompanied by an export permit issued by Italy or by documentation demonstrating
that the objects left Italy prior to the date of the import restriction."8
B. APPLICATION By HONDURAS
On August 22, 2001 the Republic of Honduras requested that the U.S. State Department
impose import restrictions on Honduran pre-Columbian archaeological materials. Hon-
duran cultural patrimony legislation dates back to 1845, when unauthorized excavation was
prohibited at the Mayan site of Copan, and Honduran authorities have determined that
Honduran archaeological materials are illicitly imported into the United States. 9
C. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH BOLIVIA
On December 4, 2001 the United States entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Government of the Republic of Bolivia resulting in import restrictions on certain
archaeological and ethnological materials originating in Bolivia. 20
D. PROPOSED RENEWAL OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH CANADA AND PERU
In 2001 the U.S. State Department proposed renewing the April 22, 1997 bilateral agree-
ment with Canada that imposes import restrictions on archaeological and ethnological
material of Canadian Aboriginal cultural groups. As part of the agreement, Canada pledged
to recognize the existence of U.S. laws that protect archaeological resources and Native
American cultural items, and to cooperate with the U.S. government in recovering such
objects that have entered Canada illicitly.2I The United States also proposed extending the
June 9, 1997 bilateral agreement with Peru. This agreement placed import restrictions on
certain categories of Pre-Columbian archaeological artifacts and Colonial period ethno-
logical materials from Peru.22
18. Agreement to protect Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Archaeological Material, available at
http://exchanges.state.gov/education/culprop/ifact.html Oast visited Aug. 1, 2002).
19. Cultural Property Request from the Government of the Republic of Honduras Under Article 9 of the
1970 UNESCO Convention, available at http://exchanges.state.gov/education/culprop/hn0lsum.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2002).
20. Archaeological and Ethnological Material From Bolivia, available at http://exchanges.state.gov/
education/culprop/blO I frO l.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2002).
21. U.S. Protection of Archaeological and Ethnological Materials, available at http://exchanges.state.gov/
education/culprop/cafact.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2002).
22. U.S. Protection of Archaeological and Ethnological Material, available at http://exchanges.state.gov/
education/culprop/pefact.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2002).
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VI. Recent Cases or Controversies Involving Cultural Property
A. ALTMANN v REPUBLIC OF AUSTRA
In Altmann v. Republic of Austria, a California federal court ruled that Austria and the
Austrian Gallery (collectively referred to as "Austria") could be sued in California based on
Nazi-era appropriations of artworks in Austria.23 The court rejected Austria's motion to
dismiss the suit, which relied upon sovereign immunity, lack of personal jurisdiction, and
forum non conveniens.
Altmann involves a Jewish family's claims for ownership of six Gustav Klimt paintings,
valued at approximately $150 million, held by Austria in the Austrian Gallery. The Nazis
seized the paintings from the plaintiff's uncle, Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, when he left Austria
in 1938. Ferdinand died a few months after the war in Europe ended. Ferdinand's wife,
who died in 1925, had expressed a wish in her will for Ferdinand to donate his paintings
to the Austrian Gallery upon his death, but Ferdinand never did SO. 2 4
Austrian legal reforms after the war did not provide complete remedies for those who
lost property to the Nazis. For example, in 1946, Austria enacted a law declaring that all
transactions motivated by discriminatory Nazi ideology were deemed to be null and void;
however, Austria often required the original owners of such property, including works of
art, to repay to the purchaser the purchase price before an item would be returned.25 Sim-
ilarly, Austrian law "prohibited the export of artworks that were deemed to be important
to Austria's cultural heritage." 26 After the war that law was used "to force Jews who sought
export of artworks to trade artworks for export permits on other works."27
In 1947, a Swiss court recognized the plaintiff-who had escaped from Austria in 1938-
as the heir to 25 percent of Ferdinand's estate. 28 Ferdinand's heirs then retained a lawyer
in Austria to attempt to recover his property, including the paintings. 29 The Gallery first
claimed that Ferdinand's wife had bequeathed the paintings to the Gallery upon her death,
and that the Gallery merely permitted Ferdinand to retain possession until his death. In
1948, after the Austrian Gallery learned that Ferdinand's wife's will did not contain such a
bequest, it suggested "that export permits for Ferdinand's collection be delayed for 'tactical
reasons"'30 and concealed the will from the heirs.3' Thereafter, an Austrian official told the
heirs' lawyer that donations to the Gallery would have to occur in order to procure export
licenses for any of Ferdinand's collection. The lawyer agreed to donate the Klimt paintings
in exchange for export licenses for the remaining items in Ferdinand's estate. The plaintiff
was unaware of the lawyer's actions until 1999. The plaintiff never authorized the lawyer
to negotiate on her behalf, nor did she authorize the "donation" of the paintings to the
23. Altmann v. Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
24. Id. at 1192-93.
25. Id. at 1193.
26. Id. at 1193-94.
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Gallery. In fact, until 1999, the Gallery's misrepresentations led the plaintiff to believe that
her family had legitimately donated the paintings.32
In 1998, after the high-profile seizure of two Egon Schiele paintings in New York, Austria
opened the Gallery's archives "to prove that no looted artworks remained in Austria."" As
a result, a journalist exposed "the fact that Austria's federal museums had profited greatly
from exiled Jewish families after the war,3 4 and the plaintiff thus discovered how the Klimt
paintings came into the Gallery's possession."
In December 1998 Austria enacted a new restitution law "designed to return artworks
that had been donated to federal museums under duress in exchange for export permits.
3 6
Pursuant to the new law, a committee of government officials and art historians "recom-
mended that hundreds of artworks be returned to their rightful owners."37 The Klimt paint-
ings initially appeared to be among such artworks. Political pressure, however, led the
committee to recommend that the paintings not be returned. Austria rejected the plaintiff's
request for arbitration and suggested that her "only remedy was to go to court." "3
Because Austria has a consular office in Los Angeles and owns real property in Los
Angeles,39 the plaintiff filed suit in a U.S. federal court in California against Austria and the
Austrian Gallery. The plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment that the Klimt paintings
should be returned pursuant to the 1998 Austrian restitution law, for replevin, for expro-
priation and conversion, and for violation of international law.- Austria argued that it was
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and it contested both the
jurisdiction and suitability of the court to hear the case.
The court rejected all of Austria's arguments. First, the court explained that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act4 (FSIA) is "the sole basis for jurisdiction over a foreign state and
its agencies and instrumentalities ... [f]oreign states are presumed to be immune from the
jurisdiction of the United States courts unless one of the FSIA's exceptions applies."42 The
court ruled that the plaintiff's suit fell within the "expropriation" exception to the FSIA
because the plaintiff claimed that (i) the "aryanization" of the art qualified as a seizure in
violation of international law; (ii) the Gallery, even though privatized in 2000, qualified as
an Austrian agency or instrumentality; and (iii) the Gallery engaged in commercial activities
in the United States, including advertising, selling an English-language guidebook, lending
certain Klimt paintings to U.S. museums-including one of the Klimts in question-and
receiving visitors from the United States each year.43
The court also made significant rulings that permitted the suit to proceed in California
despite that the critical events took place in Austria. First, the court ruled that a foreign
state is not a "person" under the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, so the legal
32. Id. at 1195 n.9.
33. Id. at 1195.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1195 n.ll.
36. Id. at 1195.
37. Id. at 1195-96.
38. Id. at 1196.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1197.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 etseq. (1994).
42. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1197-98.
43. Id. at 1201-06.
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concept of personal jurisdiction was inapplicable in this case and was not grounds for dis-
missal. In addition, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was unnecessary; any due
process concerns had been satisfied by the plaintiff's allegations of Austria's commercial
activity in the United States. The plaintiff made these allegations to establish the expro-
priation exception to the FSIA? 4 Second, the court refused to dismiss the suit based on
forum non conveniens. The Austrian courts did not provide an "adequate alternative forum"
because of its excessive court filing fees (up to $200,000). In addition, the Austrian thirty-
year statute of limitations may have barred the claim whereas California's "discovery rule,"
with regard to stolen works of art, would not bar the plaintiff's claim.?5 Finally, the court
rejected Austria's argument that the other heirs to Ferdinand's estate were necessary and
indispensable parties within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).4
The FSIA arguments were immediately appealable, and the court certified the rest of
the ruling for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Austria has appealed
the order.
B. SEA HuNr, INC. v THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPWRECKED VESSEL
In 200 1, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear a commercial salvage company's appeal
of Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel,47 a decision that awarded Spain title
to two sunken Spanish ships. This case was closely watched as an international test case on
sovereign nations' right to prevent unauthorized salvage of government-owned vessels,
namely, warships.
C. SIGNIFICANT RETURNS AND REPATRIATIONS
1. Wang Chuzbi Marble Wall Panel
From July to November 1995, the Hebei Provincial Institute of Cultural Relics, in co-
operation with the Baoding Municipal Office of Cultural Relics and Quyang County Office
of Cultural Relics, excavated a tomb of the Five Dynasties period on Xifen Hill at Xiyan-
chuan Village of Quyang County. The burial custom, tomb structure, murals, human figure
relief in white marble and astronomical map revealed in the grave are of great importance
in Five Dynasties archaeology covering the early tenth century. InJune of 1994, the Quyang
County Public Security Bureau received a report that the ancient tomb of Wang Chuzhi
had been robbed.
In December 1999, Y.C. Chui of M&C Gallery in Hong Kong consigned a wall panel
sculpture of a guardian from the Tomb of Wang Chuzhi to Christie's in New York to sell
at auction in 2000. In March 2000, the United States brought a civil action in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking forfeiture of the mural pur-
suant to the CPIA under its treaty obligation under the 1970 UNESCO Convention on
44. Id. at 1207-08.
45. Id. at 1209-10. California law provides for a three-year statute of limitations that accrues upon the
discovery of a stolen article of artistic significance. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 338 (2001). The California law
recognizes that owners of stolen works of art often are unable to immediately file a cause of action for recovery
of the artworks.
46. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1210-11.
47. Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1144 (2001).
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the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Own-
ership of Cultural Property. The People's Republic of China contended the tomb of Wang
Chuzhi and its contents are state-owned cultural property of the People's Republic of China,
and that it has ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention. A deed of settlement in the case
provided that the wall panel sculpture would be returned to YC. Chui who, in turn, agreed
to give the sculpture to the Government of the People's Republic of China. U.S. Customs
Service returned the marble wall panel to Chinese officials in May 2001. China has stated
that the panel would become part of its national Museum's permanent collection4 s
2. Cache of Artifacts Returned to Mexico, Peru, and Panama
On August 2, 2001 the U.S. Customs Service returned a cache of over 900 artifacts to
the governments of Mexico, Peru, and Panama. The artifacts were confiscated in 1994,
but the suspected smuggler fled the United States. The authorities finally arrested the
suspect in 1998 and he pled guilty to a number of charges. The suspect returned the arti-
facts as part of a civil settlement between the suspect and the Mexican, Peruvian, and
Panamian governments. 49
3. Ceramics Returned to El Salvador
In 2001 the U.S. Customs Service also returned several pre-Columbian polychrome ce-
ramics, dating from approximately 1700 B.C. to A.D. 1550, to the Government of El Sal-
vador. Customs officials seized the artifacts in San Francisco in October 2000.50
4. Stolen Artifacts Returned to Greece
In January 2001 the FBI returned 274 artifacts to Greek officials. The artifacts were
stolen in 1990 from the Archaeological Museum of Ancient Corinth. The FBI seized the
artifacts after they were consigned to Christie's for auction. One individual pled guilty on
charges related to possession of the collection, but the original thieves remain at large.5
D. U.S. INDICTMENT OF ART DEALER - RECEIVING AND POSSESSING ARTWORKS ALLEGEDLY
STOLEN AND ILLEGALLY REMOVED FROM EGYPT
On July 16, 2001 the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York indicted
Frederick Schultz, president of Frederick Schultz Ancient Art in New York City and past
president of the New York-based National Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and
Primitive Art (NADAOPA). The government accuses Schultz of violating the National
Stolen Property Act (NSPA) by conspiring to receive and possess artifacts that had been
stolen and removed illegally from Egypt.52
48. See Press Release, U.S. Custom Service, U.S. Customs Service Returns Rare 10th Century Burial Sculp-
ture to China (May 23, 2001), at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2001/0523-04.html(last
visited Feb. 19, 2002).
49. See Press Release, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Customs Returns Priceless Cultural Artifacts to Mexico,
Peru, and Panama (Aug. 1, 2001), at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2001/0801-00.htn(last
visited Feb. 19, 2002).
50. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Media Note Seized Pre-Columbian Objects Repatriated to El
Salvador in First Implementation of U.S. Import Restriction (une 21, 2001), at http://exchanges/state.gov/
education/culprop/esstatepr.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
51. See Press Release, U.S. Embassy Athens, Stolen Corinth Artifacts Return to Greek Authorities (Jan. 18,
2001), at http://exchanges.state.gov/education/culprop/greecepr.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
52. U.S. v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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The NSPA states that:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares,
or merchandise ... of the value of $5,000 or more ... which have crossed a State or United
States boundary after being stolen . . . knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully
converted, or taken... [s]hall be fined under this tide or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both."
The indictment alleges that the artifacts in question were "stolen" within the meaning
of the NSPA because, pursuant to Egyptian Law 117, the Egyptian government owned all
antiquities newly discovered inside the country after 1983. Egyptian Law 117 also prohibits
sale or export of such antiquities without the government's permission. According to the
indictment in the early 1990s a British antiquities restorer 4 traveled to Egypt and purchased
antiquities recently excavated by Egyptian "farmers and builders," removed the objects from
Egypt and consigned or sold them to Schultz.55 The objects included the head of a statue
of Amenhotep III, which Schultz allegedly sold in London for $1.2 million. In order to
make it appear that Schultz legally acquired the artifacts prior to enactment of Egyptian
Law 117, he allegedly misled potential purchasers to believe that the artifacts were from
the "Thomas Alcock Collection," which he described as a collection that had belonged to
an English family since the 1920s.16
This case has received much attention due to Schultz's high profile as a major figure in
the antiquities trade and a vocal critic of international anti-looting efforts, such as the recent
bilateral agreement between the United States and Italy. Furthermore, Schultz has chal-
lenged the long-debated McClain case," 7 which established that artifacts are stolen within
the meaning of the NSPA if a foreign law vests ownership of the artifact in the government
of that country.5" The lengthy McClain proceedings resulted in convictions based on a 1972
Mexican law unequivocally declaring state ownership of all artifacts found in Mexico. It
also reversed the portion of the convictions based on an earlier version of that law in which
the declaration of national ownership was "not expressed.., with sufficient clarity to survive
translation into terms understandable by and binding upon American citizens."59 Critics of
McClain argue that such cultural patrimony laws do not actually create property rights in
the state, but are merely export restrictions, violations of which are not prosecuted in the
United States as theft under the NSPA.60
53. National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1997).
54. In 1997, an English court convicted the restorer, Jonathan Tokeley-Parry, of stealing artifacts from
Egypt. See Steven Vincent, Antiquities Dealer Gets Ready for Court, THE ART NEwSPAPE.COM (2000), available
at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart= 7492 (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
55. Government's Indictment, at 'I 7a-c, U.S. v. Schultz, 178 F.Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 01-Cr-
683-JSR).
56. Id. at 7e.
57. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing NSPA convictions due to vagueness
of Mexican law regarding ownership over artifacts), rehearing denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1977), on remand;
United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979) (affirming conspiracy
conviction under NSPA for illegal removal of cultural property from Mexico).
58. Under such cultural patrimony laws-enacted to protect archaeological sites and control the export of
artifacts-all artifacts unearthed or discovered in a country, even if discovered on private property, automatically
belong to the government.
59. McClain, 593 F.2d at 670.
60. See, e.g., McClain, 545 F.2d at 994, 1002.
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Challenging the premises and distinctions of McClain, Schultz moved to dismiss his in-
dictment. He referred to McClain as "outdated," "discredited," and an "obsolete aberra-
tion." In late December of 2001, Judge Jed S. Rakoff denied the motion.
Relying on McClain, Schultz largely contended that the definition in Egyptian Law 117
of "antiquities" was too vague to provide fair notice of the types of artifacts that were subject
to the law.6' The court rejected that argument holding that the artifacts at issue in the
indictment ("such as a pharaoh's head and two Old Kingdom painted reliefs") obviously
fell within that description. Even if there was any ambiguity in the statute "around the
edges," it was certainly clear and understandable in this case.
62
Schultz also pointed to several provisions in Egyptian Law 117 that allow private pos-
session of antiquities subject to restrictions on alienation and transferability. Based on these
provisions, and his claim that the Egyptian government regularly allowed discoverers or
private transferees to retain antiquities, Schultz argued that this law was in actuality and
practice merely a licensing and export regulation, the violation of which does not constitute
theft of property within the meaning of the NSPA.
Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 63 the court held an
evidentiary hearing and permitted Schultz to present two witnesses in support of his inter-
pretation of Egyptian Law 117, including a professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern law
from UCLA Law School. However, the witness could at best state that nothing in the law
prevented the Egyptian government from leaving physical possession of an artifact in the
hands of a private finder, as long as the private finder registers his find.' 4 Directly refuting
Schultz's arguments, the government's witnesses, including the Secretary-General to the
Egyptian Supreme Council of Antiquities and the Director of Criminal Investigations for
the Egyptian Antiquities Police, explained that the private possession portions of the statute
applied only to artifacts discovered before 1983. They also cited tens of thousands of in-
stances where the Egyptian state took possession, as well as ownership, of artifacts discov-
ered after 1983, and presented evidence of the regular prosecution of violators of Egyptian
Law 117.6s Their testimony and evidence proved to the court that Egyptian Law 117 is not
merely an export regulation, but also an ownership law as applied to objects discovered
after 1983.
Judge Rakoff also rejected Schultz's argument that Egyptian Law 117 is a "patrimony"
law that creates a special kind of property right in a foreign state, and that such special
61. Article I of Egyptian Law 117 defines an antiquity as:
any movable or immovable property that is a product of any of the various civilizations or any of the
arts, sciences, literatures and religions of the successive historical periods extending from prehistoric
times down to a point one hundred years before the present and that has archaeological or historical
value or significance as a relic of one of the various civilizations that have been established in the land
of Egypt or historically related to it, as well as human and animal remains from any such period.
62. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 447 n.1.
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1.
Determination of Foreign Law. A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country shall give reasonable written notice. The court, in determining foreign law, may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a
question of law.
64. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
65. Id. at 448.
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property rights are not entitled to protection under U.S. law. The judge found no reason
to carve out an exception to property law simply because the object has historical or ar-
chaeological importance. 6 Finally, the court rejected Schultz's argument that the CPIA
superseded the application of the NSPA to the same subject matter. As the court pointed
out, the CPIA's legislative history specifically stated that it "neither pre-empts state law in
any way, nor modifies any Federal or State remedies."67
Thus, despite the much-anticipated battle over McClain, Judge Rakoff apparently had
little difficulty relying upon that case in denying Schultz's motion. Nor did he find Schultz's
other wide-ranging arguments to be persuasive, and described some of them as "sufficiently
meridess as not to warrant discussion."68 To prove the conspiracy allegations, however, the
prosecution must still establish at trial that Schultz actually knew the artifacts were stolen
and that he intended to violate the law. The trial began on January 28, 2002, and was
expected to last two to three weeks.
E. U.N. INDICTMENT FOR DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL SITES
In February 2001 the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in The Hague indicted a former Yugoslav army general and three other former
Yugoslav officers for violations of the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.69 The indictment arises out of their involvement
in the 1991-1992 siege and shelling of the medieval Croatian port city of Dubrovnik. Two
of the defendants have surrendered while the other two remain at large.
Founded before 667 A.D., Dubrovnik developed as a city-state loosely aligned with the
Byzantine Empire. It was an independent republic from 1358 until 1808, although it was
subject to varying levels of control by the Venetian, Ottoman and Austrian Empires. By
1918 Dubrovnik and the rest of Croatia had been incorporated into Yugoslavia. It was
known as "the Pearl of the Adriatic" and renowned for its Gothic and Renaissance archi-
tecture. In 1979 UNESCO designated Dubrovnik's "Old Town" district as a World Cul-
tural Heritage site. In compliance with UNESCO requirements for such a designation,
Dubrovnik was de-militarized-all military installations and armories were relocated into
neighboring regions. A number of buildings in the Old Town district, and the towers on
the ancient city wall, were marked with the symbol mandated by the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion.7 0
The U.N. indictment alleges that in October 1991 the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA),
under the command of defendants Pavle Strugar, Miodrag Jokic, Milan Zec and Vladimir
Kovacevic, surrounded and isolated Dubrovnik as part of a plan to wrest control of the city
from Croatia and annex it to Serbia/Montenegro.7 The Old Town district contained no
military targets and the city's ad hoc defense force allegedly offered no threat to the JNA.
After weeks of negotiations, Croatia refused to cede control of the city to the JNA. On
66. Id.
67. Id. at 449.
68. Id.
69. U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment (No. IT-01-42), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/str-iiO0227e.htm(ast visited Feb. 19, 2002).
70. Id. 9 31, 29-42.
71. Id. I 18.
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December 6, 1991, despite a cease-fire agreement covering all of Croatia, the JNA began
bombardment of Dubrovnik and its Old Town district." Sporadic shelling continued into
the middle of 1992. Approaching Croatian offensive forces finally caused the JNA to with-
draw in October 1992.
An analysis conducted by the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments, in
conjunction with UNESCO, found that 563 of the 824 buildings in the Old Town district
(68 percent) had been damaged by the attack. Nine buildings were completely destroyed.
By the end of 1999, over $7 million had been spent on restoring Dubrovnik and the project
is expected to continue until 2003, at a cost approximating $10 million. 73
These tribunal proceedings will be closely monitored, as, according to UNESCO Di-
rector General Koichiro Matsuura, this is the first prosecution by an international tribunal
for destruction of cultural property during armed conflict since the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals in the aftermath of World War 11.14 The trial should also raise interesting philo-
sophical and moral arguments contrasting "justified" and "legal" destruction during war-
time with "unjustified" and "unlawful" war damage, as charged in counts 10 through 12 of
the indictment: "devastation not justified by military necessity, unlawful attacks on civilian
objects, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion and historic
monuments" in "violation of the laws or custom of war."" In fact, the BBC quoted defen-
dant Ret. Gen. Pavle Strugar as stating upon his surrender: "I was a soldier for 42 years. I
treated people and the state in a dignified and humane manner ... That is how I acted
during the war. I am not a criminal."76 The first trial is expected in late 2002.
72. Id. 57-63.
73. Id. 65.
74. See Yugoslav General Surrenders to Hague Tribunal, THE ART NEWSPAPER.COM (2000), at http://
www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart= 7873 (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
75. The first nine counts of the indictment contain allegations of "murder, cruel treatment and attacks on
civilians" arising out of the death of forty-three civilians and the wounding of numerous others in the attack.
76. See Dubrovnik Siege General Surrenders, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/
newsid_1611000/1611571 .sn (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
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